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Introduction: The need for a settlement procedure in cartel cases 
There is little doubt that the fight against cartels is one of the most important objectives of Antitrust 
Authorities, and the European Commission (EC herewith) represents no exception in this regard. During 
the last decade or so, the EC has created a Directorate on cartels, has toughened its fines for antitrust 
violations (and in particular the most serious ones, such as cartels), and has relied on a Leniency Policy 
which has met considerable success. First introduced in 1996 without much effect, the Leniency Policy 
has been considerably improved in 2002, year in which it started to show very positive results: in the five 
years after the Leniency Notice of February 2002, more than 100 applications for immunity were filed to 
the EC, witnessing that this is an essential instrument for uncovering cartels. Indeed, a large part of the 
cartel Decisions by the EC during the last years were initiated by leniency applications.1 
 
While the Leniency Policy has been successful in triggering evidence by cartel participants and thus in 
determining the collapse of several cartels, it has not reduced considerably the length of the cartel 
proceedings, which is another potential benefit of leniency programmes.2  
 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the average ‘relative’ length of cartel investigations for selected years, where the 
‘total’ length of the investigation is the number of months elapsing from the dawn raid (the first publicly 
observable event that an investigation is under way) until the day the Commission Decision is made. 
There are then two possible ways to measure the ‘relative’ length of cartel cases: (i) to divide the total 
number of months by the number of undertakings involved; (ii) to divide it by the number of legal entities 
involved (several legal entities may belong to the same ‘undertaking’ as it may be the case when 
subsidiaries located in different member states belong to the same business group). By using the first 
measure (Figure 1), length in recent years is not very dissimilar from the length during the decade 1986-
1996. By using the second measure, an improvement in recent years can be detected, although the raw 
data presented in Appendix 2 show that even the relatively ‘quick’ cartel decisions taken in 2006-7 rarely 
                                                 
1 For a discussion and evidence on cartel activity of the EC, see e.g. Massimo Motta, "On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the 
European Union", European Competition Law Review, 29(4), 2008: 209-220. 
 
2 The economic literature identifies two main beneficial effects from leniency programmes. The first one is to induce cartel 
members to report evidence about the cartel in order to benefit from immunity before other firms do; the second one is to 
make cartel prosecution easier and shorter, as leniency applicants provide the necessary evidence. See e.g. Motta and Polo 
(2003). 
 
 2 
last less than three years: the Commission’s scarce resources are clearly occupied for too long with cartel 
cases, even when leniency programmes have unveiled crucial documentary evidence. 
Settlements in cartel cases may then allow to speed up the prosecution of cartels, and to a more efficient 
use of resources for competition authorities.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
 
In the rest of the paper, first we shall briefly report on the economic literature on settlements which may 
helpful to understand the role and effects of settlements in cartel cases in an administrative system; then 
we shall comment upon the possible design of such settlements, in particular trying to quantify the 
incentives that should optimally be given to the settling firms. To anticipate our results, we shall conclude 
that a 10% fine reduction to firms which agree to settle with the Commission may be too weak an 
incentive for firms. If we are correct (and we hope we are not!), this means that the settlements 
participation rate will not be high enough to effectively reduce the duration of cartel proceedings.  
A Brief Economic Literature Review 
 
The law and economic literature has devoted considerable attention to settlements and their criminal 
counterpart called “plea-bargaining”. A rich literature has developed on the determinants which affect the 
likelihood that a case will settle, the terms on which it is settled and how the choice between settlement 
and litigation affects social welfare. The settlements analyzed by the economic and law literature slightly 
differ from the settlements in cartel cases since the former settlements: 
1. can be interpret as private contracts used to avoid going to court; 
2. are usually among private actors; 
3. usually regard cases in which one of the issues at stake is the guilty of the defendant. 
 
Settlements in cartel cases instead: 
1. are used during the Commission’s Decision process and are not an instrument used to avoid the 
court; 
2. are between the undertaking and the Commission; 
3. the only uncertainty of settlements in cartel cases is related to the amount of the fine the 
undertaking has to pay while violation of the law as already been established. 
 
Because of these differences, only some of the elements investigated by the literature on settlements can 
be used in the analysis of settlements in cartel cases. We thus briefly report the literature relevant for 
settlements in cartel cases, and the pros and cons recognized by the literature that apply to them. 
 
The literature lists a series of determinants that help the parties to settle. Rationality of agents would lead 
to believe that saving the costs of court proceedings is always efficient, however not in all cases there are 
settlements. Landes (1971), and Posner (1973) are the earliest authors who identify in the existence of 
divergent parties expectations, the most influential account of why parties may fail to settle, with 
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litigation ending up in courts. The authors therefore suggest that, in order to make the settlement possible, 
the negotiation process must be designed to make parties’ beliefs converging.3 
Another crucial factor that determines the success of the agreement is the division of the settlement’s 
surplus among parties.4 The surplus obtained in the settlement derives from saving the costs of trial. Each 
party has an incentive to seek the lion’s share of this surplus, and if the parties do not reach a compromise 
on how to share the surplus, the settlement may again fail. 
Finally the literature has devoted some attention also to the role of the settlement’s timing; as time goes 
by, more information becomes available but cost savings go down. There is thus an optimal timing for 
settlements, which to determine is non-trivial, especially because the prosecutor and the accused may not 
have the same incentives related to time.5 
Settlements’ Pros 
There is wide consensus on the benefits of the settlement procedure. The most important benefit of 
settlements is related to the conservation of economic resources. Landes (1971) considers the condition 
under which settlements benefit both the prosecutor and the defendant assuming that court trial would 
require considerable costs for both parties. Adelstein (1978) extends Landes’ analysis to incorporate the 
time-related costs of trial proceedings. The authors conclude that there are advantages for both parties: 
prosecutors can save the trial costs and defendants can minimize the costs of punishment. Besides private 
costs saving there are also public costs savings: the parties’ time and litigation expenses typically 
constitute only a small fraction of the costs incurred in adjudicating their dispute, the rest of these costs 
being borne by the public.6  
Finally the resources freed through settlements can be allocated to the prosecution of more cases and in a 
more effective way.7  
 
Settlements’ Cons 
The most relevant argument against settlements is that settlements can reduce deterrence. Miceli (1996) 
analyzes the deterrence effects on primary behavior generated by the anticipated resolution of a case. A 
settlement resolution, through the reduction of the expected punishment, can reduce the deterrence effect 
and increase the rate of infringement of laws. The higher the expected penalty reduction, the bigger will 
be the deterrence’s decline. A possible way to avoid reduction of deterrence, as suggested by La Casse 
and Payne (1999) would then be to couple settlements with harsher sentencing. 
 
                                                 
3 In the case of settlements in cartel cases parties which agree to settle save the costs they would sustain in a longer Decision 
process.  
4 See Cooter et. al (1982). 
5 See Franzoni (1999) about the role played by the timing and the information available to the parties.  
6 See Hay and Spier (1998). 
7 See Easterbrook (1983). 
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Benefits and Drawbacks of Settlements in Cartel Cases 
The economic literature on settlements and plea-bargaining can be used to analyze the likely effects that 
settlements in cartel cases could generate. The European Commission has proposed to use settlements 
during the Decision process, in order to accelerate it. We devote this section to the analysis of potential 
benefits and drawbacks associated with settlements in cartel cases.  
Benefits 
There is large consensus that the saving of time and costs are significant benefits of cartel settlements. As 
pointed out in the previous section, even when firms apply for the Leniency Program (LP), and 
documentary evidence proving the involvement of firms has been established and is common knowledge 
to the firms and the Commission, the time span between the dawn raid and the infringement Decision 
remains quite long, due to the procedural steps involved in the Decision process. The settlement 
procedure should reduce this time by relieving the Decision’s administrative burden. This would be done 
by minimizing costs and delays that are inherent to the ordinary procedures, such as the requirement of 
multiple translations, of holding oral hearings, or the requirement to organize a full access to file. 
A shorter Decision process benefits not only the Commission, through the costs savings, but also the 
undertakings involved in the process: through a quicker Decision, undertakings save both legal and 
consultancy costs, and also the “managerial distraction costs” due to the decrease in productivity of the 
managers that are involved in the Decision process, and whose time and attention would be put to a better 
use in managerial activities. 
Moreover, if the resources saved through the use of settlements are used by the Commission to deal with 
other cases, settlements can increase the detection rate of cartels, increasing the ex ante deterrence 
effects.8 
Finally, since the parties involved in a settlement agreement are less likely to appeal the infringement 
Decision, settlements can reduce the likelihood of appeal to Court and can thus save the associated costs.  
Drawbacks 
A possible settlements’ drawback is related to the fine reduction. Since the Commission guarantees a fine 
reduction to secure the deal, lower fines are imposed, and deterrence can be diluted. However deterrence 
may not be diluted, if more resources were directed to the detection of cartels. 
When deciding whether to violate the law, the undertaking compares the gain it gets from the violation, 
with the expected costs associated with being detected, that is the fine it would obtain once detected times 
the probability of detection. In formal terms, this trade-off can be written as: 
∏ ≥ ρF  
                                                 
8 Motta and Polo (2003) analyze the effects of a change in the probability of being detected by the antitrust authority, in a 
model where the LP play a similar role as settlements: by supplying documental evidence to the antitrust authority, LP allow it 
to save costs of prosecuting cartels; resources saved in this way can be used to screen for new cartels. 
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where ∏ represents the profits from infringing the law, ρ represents the probability of being detected by 
the antitrust authority and F represents the amount of the fine. Assuming that the probability of being 
detected ρ is constant, if the expected fine decreases, for instance because of the settlement, the minimum 
profits required to infringe the law reduces as well, and a diluted deterrence effect occurs. This causal 
effect is true as long as the probability of being detected is constant. However, if the resources freed 
through the use of settlements, are devoted to the detection of other cases, then the probability of being 
detected increases. In this case the net effect on deterrence is ambiguous. The deterrence will decrease if 
the increment in the probability of being detected does not compensate the fine reduction, but deterrence 
can stay constant or even increase if the probability of being detected more than compensate the fine 
reduction.9 
Several commentators remarked on another potential drawback of settlements, which may in principle 
come from the interplay of LP and cartel settlements. If the reductions in the penalty attainable via 
settlements were too high, there could be a negative effect on the incentives to apply for the LP. If the 
sum of the fine reduction associated with settlement and that associated with the LP is equal to the full 
immunity, the incentive of being the first undertaking that applies for the LP strongly declines, and with it 
also the LP efficacy in helping break cartels. In this occurrence the cartel detection rate may decrease 
since undertakings would prefer to use a “wait and see” strategy instead of competing against each other 
to be the first applying for the LP. In the Commission Notice on settlements, however, LP and settlements 
penalty reductions are made available on a cumulative basis, and the fine’s reduction associated with 
settlements is not very high (10%). Therefore, the undertakings’ possibility to cumulate the two fine 
reductions should create an incentive to apply for both programs, and the small reduction for settlements – 
relative to immunity and fine reductions under the leniency Notice – should guarantee that settlements 
will in practice not have any negative effect on LP. 
The settlements’ benefits and drawbacks suggest analyzing the optimal settlement design in order to 
maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages associated with settlements in cartel cases. In 
the next section we investigate the tools the Commission can use to achieve this goal. 
 
                                                 
9 Obviously higher deterrence can be achieved by increasing the maximum fine imposed by the authority. However the 
authority cannot increase indefinitely the fine, since exceeded a given value, the fine negatively affects the overall economy 
outcome (for instance because firms would have to go in bankruptcy). More specifically there is in Europe nowadays the 
perception that antitrust fines have considerably increased since the adoption of the latest fining Notice, and it is unlikely that 
there could be further increase in fines.    
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Settlements Design 
The design of a settlement procedure is fundamental for its success. In this section, we investigate the 
features that influence the decision to settle both for undertakings and for a competition authority. The 
analysis is divided into two parts. The first part is dedicated to the settlements design and the effects that 
the procedure can have on private actions. The second part is dedicated to the assessment of the optimal 
fine reduction that should be granted to firms to induce them to settle. We will propose a possible 
benchmark value using data on the Commission’s and appeal Court’s fines imposed to all the EC 
infringements from 1970 to 2007, and we shall conclude that the 10% reduction being awarded by the 
Commission under the Notice may well be too weak an incentive for firms to settle. 
 Settlement Procedure   
Under the Notice, the Commission has the discretion to select cases that can settle and reserves the right 
to withdraw from the settlement procedure. For what concerns the selection of cases, the Commission’s 
intent is to consider for settlement only those cases which present high probability to reach a common 
understanding: if a common agreement were not found, there would be large costs for both the 
Commission and for the undertakings. For the Commission there would be a waste of resources and time, 
for the undertakings there would be problems related to the disclosure of information during the 
settlement procedure that could be used against them in the final Decision.10 As for withdrawal from the 
settlement procedure, the Commission’s motivation is less clear, and probably resides mainly (or only) in 
the formal respect of the responsibility of the College of the Commissioners, which is the body that 
officially takes decisions. On the one hand, the Commission’s discretion could reduce the undertakings’ 
willingness to settle since they could fear that after revealing crucial information, the Commission might 
break the settlement. On the other hand, given the strong interest of the Commission in successfully 
concluding the settlement, and the careful choice of the case to settle, it is unlikely that the Commission 
will want to withdraw from a settlement agreements, unless unexpected circumstances occur after the 
settlement submission. If undertakings are aware of this, and they should be, then settlement agreements 
will not be affected by the discretion of the Commission. 
The settlement’s success can also be undermined by the uncertainty about the level of the fines to be 
imposed on the violators. The procedure foresees that the Commission proposes a possible range of fines, 
and then, in the settlement submission, the undertaking has to indicate the maximum amount of the fine 
which it is going to accept in order to settle. If the maximum fine proposed by the undertaking is smaller 
than the Commission final Decision’s fine, the settlement fails. Instead of leaving the discretion and the 
choice of the maximum fine to the undertaking, the Commission and the undertaking should agree on a 
given fine before the settlement submission. In this case the process would be faster and the success of the 
settlement more certain. 
When entering in the settlement agreement, undertakings evaluate also the impact of the settlement on 
follow-on damages actions. Settlements may affect firms’ exposure to private litigation, by making them 
quicker and more likely. If the settlement increases the probability of private actions, the fine reduction 
associated with it could be not sufficient to attract undertakings to settle, and if the private actions’ 
                                                 
10 The Notice clearly states that if a common agreement is not reached by the parties, the acknowledgments provided by the 
parties in the settlement submission could not be used against any of the parties to the proceedings; however, parties may 
worry that any information disclosed during the procedure may later be used by the Commission.  
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damages exceed the fine reduction, undertakings will not find it optimal to settle. Therefore, it would be 
appropriate to design the settlement procedure in such a way that the probability of incurring in private 
actions would not be higher than the probability of private actions that the undertakings face in the 
standard Decision process. While the increment of private actions’ risk can be interpreted as an instrument 
to increase deterrence, the voluntary nature of settlements suggests that the eventual increment of private 
actions’ risk would have just a negative effect on settlements’ participation rather than a positive effect on 
deterrence.   
 
Optimal Fine Reduction 
The Commission Notice specifies the amount of the fine reduction associated with settlement at the level 
of 10%. The fine discount is crucial for the success of a settlement procedure. On the one hand, too high a 
fine reduction might have negative effects on deterrence (and even on the participation to the leniency 
programmes); on the other hand, too low a fine reduction does not create incentives for undertakings to 
settle. Obviously, it is not straightforward to quantify the optimal amount of fine’s reduction. In the 
previous sections we have listed a series of factors which affect the settlement success. We add to the list 
also the interplay between settlements and appeal to the Court. The Commission Notice does not impede 
undertakings to appeal to the Court after the settlement is over, but it would be surprising if undertakings 
that have settled will receive a fine reduction by the Court. When deciding to enter in a settlement the 
undertaking thus will compare the fine it would receive if settling, with the fine it would expect to receive 
if appealing the Court. If the latter exceeds the former, the undertaking will decide not to settle. Among 
all the factors that influence the undertakings’ decision to settle, the expected fine reduction that an 
undertaking can receive by appealing the Commission’s Decision can be quantified. In light of this 
consideration, in the next section we analyze the average fine reduction received by undertakings which 
appealed to the Court. Through the analysis of those data we propose a possible benchmark fine reduction 
associated with settlements.  
 
A tentative benchmark: the fine reductions awarded by Courts 
Through the analysis of the final Decision fines inflicted by the Commission and the correspondent 
reductions given by the Community Court, it is possible to establish the average fine reduction received 
by undertakings that appealed. The analysis is based on all the European competition law infringements 
occurred between 1970 and 2007.11 
 
The data analysis suggests that the expected fine reduction received by undertakings if appealing the 
Commission’s Decision is equal to 26%.12 This percentage represents a benchmark value of the expected 
gain from appealing the Commission Decision to the Community Courts, but it may miss some important 
dimensions of the appeal. On the one hand, an undertaking appealing to Court bears legal costs and 
consultancy fees which are not easy to quantify but which are non-negligible; it also incurs a cost due to 
the managerial distraction, and all this can decrease the profitability of appealing. On the other hand, 
some commentators argue that a manager may have an incentive to postpone a final (negative) decision to 
a later period when he or she may not be working in the company any longer, rather than settling and 
                                                 
11 We do not distinguish between infringements of Art.81 and Art.82, but the former consists of the vast majority of cases. 
12 See the Appendix 1 for more details on the analysis. 
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renouncing to the appeal, which may be interpreted as an admission of responsibility (and would entail an 
immediate payment of the fine, when financial assets may instead be used for other purposes).13   
 
A more accurate estimate of the optimal fine reduction for settlements should try to quantify all the gains 
and losses that both parties have in entering the settlement, and we believe that a more structured 
empirical analysis in this direction could be a promising agenda for future research. However, to the 
extent that participation to the settlement procedure undermines the rationale of appeal to the Community 
Courts, or at least its possibility of success, even the mere estimate of the average expected fine reduction 
of an appeal can be suggestive. Our estimation tells us that – on the basis of all evidence on competition 
case law – a firm which appeals to the courts should expect a reduction of the fine by roughly a quarter: 
will a 10% reduction a sufficient incentive for agreeing to settle? 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the economic effects of a settlement procedure in cartel cases, and argued 
that the settlement procedure will speed up the prosecution of cartels and save resources. 
 
We have focused the analysis on the optimal fine reduction determination, since it is crucial for the 
success of settlements: on the one hand, too low a fine reduction would compromise the participation rate 
of firms into settlements; on the other hand, too high a fine reduction would affect deterrence. 
 
We have proposed a tentative quantification of the optimal fine reduction through the analysis of the fines 
imposed by the Commission and the corresponding fine reductions awarded by the Community Courts, 
for all the European competition law infringements occurred between 1970 and 2007. This exercise has 
been motivated by the consideration that a firm which decides to settle likely foregoes the possibility to 
appeal to the Court since, even if the Commission Notice does not impede undertakings to appeal to the 
Court, it is unlikely that after settling undertakings receive a fine reduction by the Court. For this reason, 
when deciding to enter in a settlement the undertaking will compare the fine it receives if settling, with 
the fine it would expect to receive if appealing to the Courts. If the latter exceeds the former, the 
undertaking decides not to settle. Our empirical analysis shows that the expected fine reduction of a firm 
that appeals to the Community Courts is about 26%. 
Our result is quite far from the 10% fine reduction established by the Commission. This discrepancy casts 
doubts on the ability of the fine reduction to attract firms to settle.14 If we are right, then the settlement 
partecipation rate will be low and the whole impact of settlements’ introduction on the lenght of cartels’ 
prosecution will be quite small. 
 
                                                 
13 However, empirical research shows that both the surprise inspection and the Commission’s infringement decision are events 
which trigger a sizeable reduction – each by the order of 2% - in the firm’s share prices. This would suggest that the market 
‘punishes’ the firm for the violation (or expected violation) without waiting for the Court judgment. See Gregor Langus and 
Massimo Motta,  "On the Effect of EU Cartel Investigations and Fines on the Infringing Firms’ Market Value", in Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds.), Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 363-376. 
14 This is especially true if the firms prefer to engage in delaying tactics (for instance if the current management prefers to 
postpone the payment of fines to the future, when a different management may be in charge) or if they are risk-lovers (there is 
some empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis). 
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Appendix 1 
 
The fine reductions awarded by the Court 
 
In this appendix we describe in details the data’s analysis. We have organized the dataset in two samples. 
The first sample (D1) coincides with the whole dataset. In this sample, we consider both the undertakings 
that appealed and those that did not appealed. The second sample (D2) is a subset of D1 which includes 
only the undertakings which appealed to the court. In D1 we have normalized to zero the hypothetical fine 
reduction that undertakings receive if they appeal. This assumption implies that the undertakings which 
decided not to appeal did so because they anticipated that in appeal they would receive a zero fine 
reduction. Of course if undertakings had appealed, they could also have received a discount bigger than 
zero. In this case the fine reduction would be bigger than the one we have estimated based on the zero 
discount assumption. We thus assume a zero discount for the firms that did not appeal to compute a 
lower-bound fine reduction, which represents the lowest possible average fine reduction given by the 
Court. 
 
On each dataset we have computed two statistics. The first statistic (S1) has been computed by averaging 
the percentage fine reduction received by undertakings in each case. The second statistic (S2) has been 
computed by first averaging the Decision’s fines, then averaging the appeals’ fines, and finally by 
computing the fine reduction using those averages. The results are reported in the following table. 
 
 
 S1 S2 
D1 26% 24% 
D2 39% 35% 
 
From the analysis of S1 computed using the sample D1 it is possible to see that an undertaking which 
appeals the final Decision of the Commission has, on average, a fine discount of 26%. As expected the 
averages fine reduction computed on the sample D2 are bigger than that computed on D1, for the reason 
explained before. When taking the averages of the series before computing the percentage reductions, 
statistic S2, the fine reduction is smaller than when first computing the fine reductions and then averaging 
them, statistic S1. Statistic S1 can be interpreted as an unweighted average fine reduction, since the fine 
reductions are not weighted by their relative value. Instead when first is taken the average, the relative 
value of the fine is taken into account. The difference between the two statistics, tells us that the Court 
gives bigger fine discounts to cases which have received a relatively smaller fine during the Decision. 
To explain this result we can use an example; suppose that our sample is made by only two cases: in the 
first, the undertaking receives a fine equal to 10, and on appeal it receives a fine reduction of 100%; in the 
second case the undertaking receives a fine equal to 100, and on appeal it receives no fine reduction. In 
this example the undertaking which has the lower fine receives the higher fine reduction. If we compute 
statistic S1 and S2 on this sample we find that S1 is bigger than S2 (they are respectively equal to 50%, 
and almost 10%).15    
 
                                                 
15 If instead the undertaking which has the lower fine receives the lower fine reduction S1 would be smaller than S2. 
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We have also computed statistic S1 on different time spam to see if the Court’s fines reduction has 
changed through time. The sample used is D2. The results are reported in the following table. 
 
 S1 
%  Unweighted Average Fine Reduction 
(1970/1979) 24% 
%  Unweighted Average Fine Reduction 
(1980/1989) 16% 
%  Unweighted Average Fine Reduction 
(1990/1999) 42% 
%  Unweighted Average Fine Reduction 
(2000/2007) 51% 
 
In the last years the fine reduction granted by the Court has increased with respect to the previous years. 
This increment is particularly pronounced after 2000. The average fine reduction granted from 1970 to 
1999 is equal to 32%. 16 
                                                 
16 This exercise has been performed using statistic S1 since S2 would be biased from the use of current price fines. Since the 
official statistic of ECU’s CPI is not available from 1970 to 2007, it is not possible to transform the fines from current values to 
constant values. A price index of ECU’s is available from 1990 to 2007; we use this price index to compute constant price fines 
and to compute on them statistic S2. We find that S2 computed on constant prices fines does not differ much from S2 
computed on current prices fines.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Data on the length of decision 
 
 
Name of the case 
Number of 
undertakings 
Number 
of legal 
entities 
Inspection 
date 
Date of 
decision 
Length of 
investigation 
(months) Leniency 
Per-firm length of 
investigation 
(months/undertakings) 
Per-firm 
length of 
cartel investi-
gation 
(months / 
legal entities) 
Polypropane 15 15 Oct-83 Apr-86 30 no 2.00 2.00 
PVC 14 14 Oct-83 Dec-88 62 no 4.43 4.43 
Flat Glass 3 3 Jul-85 Jul-88 36 no 12.00 12.00 
Welded Steel mesh 14 14 Nov-85 Feb-89 39 no 2.79 2.79 
Dutch Building 
cartel 30 30 Jul-87 May-92 58 no 1.93 1.93 
Solvay/ICI 2 2 Mar-89 Dec-90 21 no 10.50 10.50 
Solvay/CFK 2 2 Mar-89 Dec-90 21 no 10.50 10.50 
Cartonboard 23 39 Apr-91 Jul-94 39 no 1.70 1.00 
Far Eastern Freight  14 14 Apr-93 Nov-94 19 no 1.36 1.36 
British sugar 4 4 May-94 Oct-98 53 yes 13.25 13.25 
Greek Ferries 7 7 Jul-94 Dec-98 53 yes 7.57 7.57 
Steamless Steel B 8 8 Dec-94 Aug-99 56 yes 7.00 7.00 
Pre-Insulated pipe 10 10 Jun-95 Oct-98 40 yes 4.00 4.00 
Carbonless paper 11 11 Feb-97 Dec-01 58 yes 5.27 5.27 
Aminoacids 5 9 Jun-97 Jul-00 37 yes 7.40 4.11 
Graphite electrodes 8 8 Jun-97 Jul-01 49 yes 6.13 6.13 
Industial Glass 7 7 Dec-97 Jul-02 55 yes 7.86 7.86 
Zinc Phospate 6 6 May-98 Dec-01 43 yes 7.17 7.17 
Austrial Banks 8 8 May-98 Jun-02 49 yes 6.13 6.13 
Plasterboard 4 4 Nov-98 Nov-02 48 yes 12.00 12.00 
Bank Charges 5 5 Feb-99 Dec-01 34 no 6.80 6.80 
Vitamins 13 13 May-99 Nov-01 30 yes 2.31 2.31 
Methionine 3 4 Jun-99 Jul-02 37 yes 12.33 9.25 
Interbrew 4 5 Oct-99 May-01 19 yes 4.75 3.80 
French Brewers 2 4 Jan-00 Sep-04 56 no 28.00 14.00 
Monochloroacetic 
acid 5 12 Mar-00 Jan-05 58 yes 11.60 4.83 
SAS/Maersk 2 2 Jun-00 Jul-01 13 yes 6.50 6.50 
Methyglycamine 2 3 Jan-01 Nov-02 22 yes 11.00 7.33 
Industrial tubes 3 6 Mar-01 Dec-03 33 yes 11.00 5.50 
Copper plumber 
tubes 9 21 Mar-01 Mar-04 36 yes 4.00 1.71 
Raw Tobacco 
Spain 9 13 Oct-01 Oct-04 36 yes 4.00 2.77 
Needles 3 6 Nov-01 Oct-04 35 yes 11.67 5.83 
Thread 10 17 Nov-01 Sep-05 46 yes 4.60 2.71 
Fench Beef 6 6 Dec-01 Feb-03 14 no 2.33 2.33 
Rubber Chemicals 4 8 Mar-02 Dec-05 45 yes 11.25 5.63 
Raw tobacco Italy 6 8 Apr-02 Oct-05 42 yes 7.00 5.25 
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Name of the case 
Number of 
undertakings 
Number 
of legal 
entities 
Inspection 
date 
Date of 
decision 
Length of 
investigation 
(months) Leniency 
Per-firm length of 
investigation 
(months/undertakings) 
Per-firm 
length of 
cartel investi-
gation 
(months / 
legal entities) 
Industrial Bags 16 26 Jun-02 Nov-05 41 yes 2.56 1.58 
Butimen 
Netherland 14 31 Oct-02 Sep-06 47 yes 3.36 1.52 
Methycrylates 5 14 Dec-02 May-06 41 yes 8.20 2.93 
Hydrogen peroxide 9 17 Mar-03 Mar-06 36 yes 4.00 2.12 
Synthetic Rubber 6 13 Mar-03 Nov-06 44 yes 7.33 3.38 
Elevators and 
Escalators 5 26 Jan-04 Feb-07 37 yes 7.40 1.42 
Gas Insulated 
Switchgear 11 20 May-04 Jan-07 32 yes 2.91 1.60 
Copper Fittings 11 31 ? Sep-06   yes   0.00 
Dutch beer 4 6 ? Apr-07   yes   0.00 
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